The Pentagon's New Map - A Coherent & Thorough Vision of America's Global Security Role

Wednesday, June 22, 2005

A number of months ago, I came across the author of this book delivering a detailed and complex presentation on CSPAN. I only caught snippets, but was deeply impressed with the bits I saw. A few weeks later, I located and procured a copy of his book. I began reading The Pentagon's New Map with great interest, but as is often the case when I start new books, I got distracted before making much progress. However, in the past couple of weeks, I've returned to the book and have now completed it. I'm glad I did. I found it so compelling that I knew well before I actually completed it, that it would be the subject of my next post. In my opinion this is essential reading for anyone engaging in thoughtful discussion of Iraq, the war on Terrorism, the role of the US military in the world, etc.

PNM in: Hardcover
PNM in: Paperback

The author is Thomas P.M. Barnett. I'll defer to Mr. Barnett to give you his more complete particulars within the context of PNM. But his background is as a military analyst, with expertice in the former Soviet Union and China. PNM is significant in it's comprehensive contextual discussion of 9/11 and the war on terror. The essential context Barnett richly provides is his observation of end of the cold-war era, and Barnett is exceptionally qualified to provide it. While this material was engaging on its own merits, what I found truly epic about the work is its coherent expression of a robust strategic vision I believe the War on Terror and the War in Iraq has lacked.

To say that these initiatives have been defective for lack of vision is not to say the administration does not possess a meaningful vision. I am confident it does. The administration is not so irresponsible as to come this far down the tracks in Afghanistan and Iraq without such a vision. However, the administration has not effectively communicated a richer vision than a virtually perpetual jihad against global terrorism, we are left to wonder what it is. The least trusting among us are left to suppose the worst while the most trusting among us struggle to appreciate the anxiety of the less trusting. Whatever the administration's fuller vision, I am confident it would be enriched by integration with Mr. Barnett's.

Mr. Barnett's vision doesn't just satiate the hunger for a comprehensive vision. For me, it is also a morally rich vision. This is a vision which I believe not only could, but SHOULD serve as the basis for US foreign policy in the next several generations.

It's unfair to Mr. Barnett to attempt a summary of the work, but I'll do it anyway. The key concept, as the title describes, is a map of the globe. This map draws a dotted line between what Barnett describes as the core and the gap. The core are the globally integrated states. The gap are the non-integrated remainder of states. In general, the gap tends to occupy a geography visually resembling an inner-tube circling the globe's central latitudes. International connectedness is the discrimnating criteria for inclusion in the Core. Care nations also tend to economically better of, as a function of the very connectedness that defines them as members of the Core. Econ 101, or basic International Economics reveals this as a fairly obvious condition for economically open and integrated states.

Core states enjoy significantly higher levels of security, peace and stability. What provides this stability? Common rule sets and a version of mutually assured destruction that is economic in nature. Once nations and people have integrated and begun to enjoy the resultant rises in standards of living across their geographies, it's really hard to go back. Standard large-army war is so patently destructive to these economic advantages, that Core nations choose other means for resolving disputes. Not only is nuclear war out of the question for Core nations, but so is standard warfare with other Core states.

Alternatively, the Gap is characterized by isolation, disconnectedness and a "nothing-to-lose" mentality about warfare and conflict very disturbing to core nations. However, most of the gap nations are relatively economically destitute. So, for Gap nations, large-army war is also not an option. Instead, they must resort to more subversive methods. Their relative isolation also provides a safe haven for Usama types who want to operate off the Core's grid. In fact, these Usama types gain influence by re-inforceing isolationist sentiment and encouraging intolerance and hatred for the Core. In fact, they are dependent on disconnectedness and act to promote and defend that disconnectedness as long as they're around. Left unaltered, this virtually assures that the nation will continue in relative destitution.

Burnett observes that the dividends of our investment in the post-WWII and post-Cold War eras is a military without equal anywhere on the planet. He also recognizes that the core has begun to recognize a peace and security dividend which has propelled significant economic growth throught the core over approximately the last 20 years. Burnett then urges persuasively the existence of a moment of unprecedented opportunity to further extend the benefits of life in the Core to nations and peoples long victimized by repetitive regimes of repression. It is this concept of opportunity that is the essence of Barnett's vision. And it is this essence that epitomizes the resulting morality of his vision. In my opinion, there is not only an unprecedented opportunity to further US national security interests by expanding the Core and shrinking the Gap, but there is a concomitant moral obligation associated with this position of unrivaled military might we've worked so persistently to obtain.

In the context of this purposeful vision, Barnett addresses a variety of directly related topics. These include recommendations to overhaul the military to meet the evolving demands to be placed on those valuable resources, the doctrine of pre-emption, regime change, empire building, etc. None of these discussion topics come as any surprise, but the results Barnett reaches seem crisper and more certain because of the context PNM provides. Thankfully, Barnett does not limit himself to discussion of these obviously related subjects. He also takes time and pains to address key supporting subjects, such as economic policy, energy policy, immigration policy, foreign aid, etc. Again, the context PNM provides, draws proper US policy on these subjects into sharp focus and lends signficant credibility to Barnett's conclusions.

Only after finishing the book did I locate Barnett's personal site and begin tracking his blog. I haven't had the time to come up to speed entirely, but I quickly learned of Barnett's sequel work, already submitted to the publisher, Blueprint For Action, which Amazon reports will be shipping 10/20/2005. PNM was published in April, 2004, so it's certainly not out of date. Besides, a vision this epic becomes a landmark by which we mark time, rather than time taking a toll on it. However, the rapidly evolving circumstances around the War in Iraq and the greater War on Terror led me to wonder about a sequel work before I ever finished reading PNM. So, as soon as I finished, I begain the search for more Barnett materials and more current Barnett materials. I'm anxious to get my hands on a copy of Barnett's blueprint. Until then, the articles and blogs will keep me on pace with Barnett. And in the meantime, perhaps the administration can find its way toward Barnett's vision and begin pursuing a vision that is both more purposeful and more vivid or explicit.

Now Is The Time - Looking Ahead to North Korea & Iran

Thursday, May 19, 2005

My long-time friend has hosted a blog for years at the Improvist. We've managed to orchestrate the semblance of a respectful relationship for years now despite some time, distance and significant political disparateness. A lot of that disparateness is probably rhetorical. I try to remind him that we aren't as different as we sometimes sound, but this belies an undeniable core of genuine difference.

I think I knew this would always be the case when one morning on our walk to High School, we were discussing the upcoming Presidential election. I had just reached the age of majority and was preparing to cast my first ever Presidential ballot for then VP, George H. Bush. It was an easy decision for me. My mind had been made up for a long time and Dukakis did little to alter my nascent pseudo-independent thinking. My dad was active in the local Republican party, and I had participated in a variety of political events, campaigns and activities with my dad and with the party over the preceding years. Mostly by association with my Dad. But, not surprisingly, my political temperment was cast early in the mold of my parents, particularly my Dad, who I respected for his cool analytical reasoning.

Though my friend Dan now claims not to remember saying it, I do. He casually mentioned in that conversation on the way to school that (he was not yet old enough to vote) he considered Jesse Jackson a good candidate. Maybe he was making it up. Maybe, since he wasn't voting, he wasn't really following the race. Whatever the case, I think I first knew at that moment that my friend and I were different. For all we had in comon in terms of background, upbringing, religion, etc., we really had some fundamentally divergent ways of looking at public policy. Coming to a better understanding of those differences and the forces that motivate them has been and continues to be an irreplaceable education for me. Thanks Dan.

Since that day, we've agreed on a lot of important things, shared a lot of interests and have continued to disagree on a lot of political stuff. The War in Iraq is no exception. I won't attempt to detail the subtleties of those differences here. In fact, I won't at present take time to detail my own admittedly complex opinion of the war. Now is the time for a more important discourse.

A May 12th article in the Economist made the urgency of this discourse clear to me. Whatever your opinion of the War in Iraq, one thing is certain, the planet presently has 2 important nuclear rogues to deal with in Iran and North Korea, whatever stage of rogueness may actually attend them. The time is ripe for an active and vigorous discussion of US and international policy with regard to these two states. Dan will assert that I have adopted a neocon agenda which will shortly call for US military pressure on one of both of these "next threats". I respectfully dissent. I hope the reaso for that dissent will be clear in what follows.

The present trajectory of both of these states with regard to nuclear might is unambiguous. All reasonable paths to prevent these dual collision courses from materializing must be aggressively debated. A unifying policy must be developed to deal with these and future putative nuclear nations. Let us leave Iraq behind for a moment.

To my good friend and all who have bravely and boldly opposed the military invasion of Iraq, I say, now is your golden hour. Show us the better way. There are 2 fertile fields in which your notions for effectively managing a rogue nuclear proliferator may be suitably tested. I would urge that the military and economic commitment the US has made to Iraq makes similar activity in Iran and North Korea virtually impossible, even if it were warranted. Cold War tactics and strategies won't do, they simply aren't in the offing this time around. What is the goal? Containment doesn't suffice. Something bold and something proactive must be done to turn the tide of nuclear development among these states. The risks of failure are grave. These fringe states simply can't be permitted to traffic in these materials because they do not subscribe to the same rules of engagement in handling them that must accompany them. So, how to proceed?

I offer for your consideration this possible strategy. So much of the high stakes game that is nuclear proliferation hide and seek is justified by the excuses of need for nuclear power. I say take all those excuses away. Give these nations all the nuclear power they want. I don't mean permit them to develop it. I mean, as a government, give it to them! Give them lots of it. More than they need. Teach them to safely use and control it. It doesn't matter that Iran has sufficient oil & gas and does not need nuclear power. Eliminate the excuse. If it works, it will be cheaper by far than the costs of military involvement. Also invite them to the table of the international community, with economic openness, development and all that comes with it, as much as they can stomache and then a little more.

All that is given to these nations should be given by the international community as a whole. Not by a single nation. Individual nations contribute, and the international community distributes the technology openly and transparently. What are the strings? Simple:

Offer all this with just two conditions: 1) they agree now and forever to destroy and end all development of nuclear weapons programs, and 2) they agree to vigorous, open, ongoing inspections of all nuclear programs and sites. Consequences for breaking this agreement must be severe, but the incentives for them to remain true to the conditions must be likewise substantial. Carrot and stick diplomacy of the simplest kind, no doubt. Perhaps we add some final conditions regarding economic openness. The more effectively we integrate these nations into the global economy and society, the more they'll gain, the more they'll have to lose and the less of a threat they'll become.

There are at least a couple of obvious concerns with such a policy. One is simply the cost to administer such a program in these two nations. Aggravating these cost concerns is the potential for nations who do not currently exhibit nuclear ambitions to develop them for the explicit purpose of obtaining a similar "aid" package. Actually, I don't think this is a criticism at all. I'm not setting them up as straw men, they just seemed to me to be the biggest immediate questions about a program of this sort. The costs are dramatically lower than military options. And I say the more nations who want to participate, the merrier. Perhaps over time, this model could prove to be a meaningful way to bring many such fringe nations into the international community. The same conditions would apply to every nation taking advantage of the program. They'd have to agree to our rules about usage and nonproliferation. Again, I urge consideration of the costs of Iraq. Not just the direct costs, but also the indirect charges against the US credibility and respect around the world.

The other major concern I see is that these nations simply abuse the gesture and use the programs as a step stool to develop weapons programs anyway. So, we destroy the gift. We're out the money and now the international community is more unified in deeling with the offenders. There's also the risk that inspections don't reveal underground weapons development programs and the international community gets a surprise. It's a risk. But if we design the technology and we monitor its use vigorously, we're good for the short term. In the long term, it's the economic openness that pays the dividends. Before long, their integration in the developing world economy will present a value in terms of connectedness that outweighs the value of developing or using nuclear weapons.

In my mind the largest disadvantage of our present commitment in Iraq is the manner in which our usual threats to rogue states are rendered impotent. Any fringe nation with an ounce of intelligence knows we're spread thin. Today, the threats don't carry the (arguably little) weight they'd carry were we not otherwise engaged. The critical consequence is that any policy of intimidation or strong-arm diplomacy faces significany obstacles from a credibility perspective. We may or may not have the will to carry out more threats, but we don't have the resources to do much more than we're doing today, and consequently can do little more than wave a threatening finger.

In my opinion the best way to generate long-term stability with these fringe potential nuclear states is to open them up economically and socially. We need to be prepared to provide sufficient incentive for them to do so. Obviously, we can't be foolish enough to give greatly without demanding things in return. But making everything conditional doesn't always work either. Sometimes, you have to prime the pump. We need to be prepared to make the first overtures. When I say we, I don't just mean the US unilaterally. We in these instances means the international community as a whole and even Europe in particular. We need to help motivate it, but it might almost work better if we keep a low profile, particularly in the case of Iran. Conversely in North Korea, it might actually work better if the US is more directly involved. That's what they want. Give them some legitimacy. Give them some respect. But clearly define the rules of the next stage of their national development.

Operationally, there's a lot of complexity here and there would be a lot of heavy negotiating among nations about who gets the contracts to do the work and supply the materials. Who develops the standards, etc., etc., etc. I don't mean to understate the logisticall morass that could ensue. But it's all workable.

Yes, this could all fail and we could wind up with nothing but military options remaining, having wasted time and resources. But frankly, time isn't on our side on this one. We need to act quickly and we can't depend on sufficient military resources in the near term, whatever the merits of that course might be. Even if a course such as I've suggest is tried and fails, we should be able to buy ourselves some time. Perhaps enough time to extricate ourselves from Iraq and again pose a legitimate threat of forceful leverage.

So, to my friend Dan and all those opposed to our presence in Iraq, I invite you to help me build this strategy to deal with Iran and North Korea effectively today. I find it troubling to hear so much hand wringing over Iraq when there is still so much to be done in other venues. I invite you to a dialogue designed to form and inform a positive strategy for incorporating the 2 apparently most lethal fringe nations into the modern international and global community. Or if you prefer another angle of addressing these states, articulate that instead. It is my belief that the nuclear ambitions of these nations must not merely be delayed, disrupted, or defused. They must be abolished. The future must be rewritten. Now Is The Time to turn our dialogue away from Iraq and its sniping for a moment and instead toward a positive vision for dealing with Iran & North Korea.