Thursday, May 19, 2005
My long-time friend has hosted a blog for years at the Improvist. We've managed to orchestrate the semblance of a respectful relationship for years now despite some time, distance and significant political disparateness. A lot of that disparateness is probably rhetorical. I try to remind him that we aren't as different as we sometimes sound, but this belies an undeniable core of genuine difference.
I think I knew this would always be the case when one morning on our walk to High School, we were discussing the upcoming Presidential election. I had just reached the age of majority and was preparing to cast my first ever Presidential ballot for then VP, George H. Bush. It was an easy decision for me. My mind had been made up for a long time and Dukakis did little to alter my nascent pseudo-independent thinking. My dad was active in the local Republican party, and I had participated in a variety of political events, campaigns and activities with my dad and with the party over the preceding years. Mostly by association with my Dad. But, not surprisingly, my political temperment was cast early in the mold of my parents, particularly my Dad, who I respected for his cool analytical reasoning.
Though my friend Dan now claims not to remember saying it, I do. He casually mentioned in that conversation on the way to school that (he was not yet old enough to vote) he considered Jesse Jackson a good candidate. Maybe he was making it up. Maybe, since he wasn't voting, he wasn't really following the race. Whatever the case, I think I first knew at that moment that my friend and I were different. For all we had in comon in terms of background, upbringing, religion, etc., we really had some fundamentally divergent ways of looking at public policy. Coming to a better understanding of those differences and the forces that motivate them has been and continues to be an irreplaceable education for me. Thanks Dan.
Since that day, we've agreed on a lot of important things, shared a lot of interests and have continued to disagree on a lot of political stuff. The War in Iraq is no exception. I won't attempt to detail the subtleties of those differences here. In fact, I won't at present take time to detail my own admittedly complex opinion of the war. Now is the time for a more important discourse.
A May 12th article in the Economist made the urgency of this discourse clear to me. Whatever your opinion of the War in Iraq, one thing is certain, the planet presently has 2 important nuclear rogues to deal with in Iran and North Korea, whatever stage of rogueness may actually attend them. The time is ripe for an active and vigorous discussion of US and international policy with regard to these two states. Dan will assert that I have adopted a neocon agenda which will shortly call for US military pressure on one of both of these "next threats". I respectfully dissent. I hope the reaso for that dissent will be clear in what follows.
The present trajectory of both of these states with regard to nuclear might is unambiguous. All reasonable paths to prevent these dual collision courses from materializing must be aggressively debated. A unifying policy must be developed to deal with these and future putative nuclear nations. Let us leave Iraq behind for a moment.
To my good friend and all who have bravely and boldly opposed the military invasion of Iraq, I say, now is your golden hour. Show us the better way. There are 2 fertile fields in which your notions for effectively managing a rogue nuclear proliferator may be suitably tested. I would urge that the military and economic commitment the US has made to Iraq makes similar activity in Iran and North Korea virtually impossible, even if it were warranted. Cold War tactics and strategies won't do, they simply aren't in the offing this time around. What is the goal? Containment doesn't suffice. Something bold and something proactive must be done to turn the tide of nuclear development among these states. The risks of failure are grave. These fringe states simply can't be permitted to traffic in these materials because they do not subscribe to the same rules of engagement in handling them that must accompany them. So, how to proceed?
I offer for your consideration this possible strategy. So much of the high stakes game that is nuclear proliferation hide and seek is justified by the excuses of need for nuclear power. I say take all those excuses away. Give these nations all the nuclear power they want. I don't mean permit them to develop it. I mean, as a government, give it to them! Give them lots of it. More than they need. Teach them to safely use and control it. It doesn't matter that Iran has sufficient oil & gas and does not need nuclear power. Eliminate the excuse. If it works, it will be cheaper by far than the costs of military involvement. Also invite them to the table of the international community, with economic openness, development and all that comes with it, as much as they can stomache and then a little more.
All that is given to these nations should be given by the international community as a whole. Not by a single nation. Individual nations contribute, and the international community distributes the technology openly and transparently. What are the strings? Simple:
Offer all this with just two conditions: 1) they agree now and forever to destroy and end all development of nuclear weapons programs, and 2) they agree to vigorous, open, ongoing inspections of all nuclear programs and sites. Consequences for breaking this agreement must be severe, but the incentives for them to remain true to the conditions must be likewise substantial. Carrot and stick diplomacy of the simplest kind, no doubt. Perhaps we add some final conditions regarding economic openness. The more effectively we integrate these nations into the global economy and society, the more they'll gain, the more they'll have to lose and the less of a threat they'll become.
There are at least a couple of obvious concerns with such a policy. One is simply the cost to administer such a program in these two nations. Aggravating these cost concerns is the potential for nations who do not currently exhibit nuclear ambitions to develop them for the explicit purpose of obtaining a similar "aid" package. Actually, I don't think this is a criticism at all. I'm not setting them up as straw men, they just seemed to me to be the biggest immediate questions about a program of this sort. The costs are dramatically lower than military options. And I say the more nations who want to participate, the merrier. Perhaps over time, this model could prove to be a meaningful way to bring many such fringe nations into the international community. The same conditions would apply to every nation taking advantage of the program. They'd have to agree to our rules about usage and nonproliferation. Again, I urge consideration of the costs of Iraq. Not just the direct costs, but also the indirect charges against the US credibility and respect around the world.
The other major concern I see is that these nations simply abuse the gesture and use the programs as a step stool to develop weapons programs anyway. So, we destroy the gift. We're out the money and now the international community is more unified in deeling with the offenders. There's also the risk that inspections don't reveal underground weapons development programs and the international community gets a surprise. It's a risk. But if we design the technology and we monitor its use vigorously, we're good for the short term. In the long term, it's the economic openness that pays the dividends. Before long, their integration in the developing world economy will present a value in terms of connectedness that outweighs the value of developing or using nuclear weapons.
In my mind the largest disadvantage of our present commitment in Iraq is the manner in which our usual threats to rogue states are rendered impotent. Any fringe nation with an ounce of intelligence knows we're spread thin. Today, the threats don't carry the (arguably little) weight they'd carry were we not otherwise engaged. The critical consequence is that any policy of intimidation or strong-arm diplomacy faces significany obstacles from a credibility perspective. We may or may not have the will to carry out more threats, but we don't have the resources to do much more than we're doing today, and consequently can do little more than wave a threatening finger.
In my opinion the best way to generate long-term stability with these fringe potential nuclear states is to open them up economically and socially. We need to be prepared to provide sufficient incentive for them to do so. Obviously, we can't be foolish enough to give greatly without demanding things in return. But making everything conditional doesn't always work either. Sometimes, you have to prime the pump. We need to be prepared to make the first overtures. When I say we, I don't just mean the US unilaterally. We in these instances means the international community as a whole and even Europe in particular. We need to help motivate it, but it might almost work better if we keep a low profile, particularly in the case of Iran. Conversely in North Korea, it might actually work better if the US is more directly involved. That's what they want. Give them some legitimacy. Give them some respect. But clearly define the rules of the next stage of their national development.
Operationally, there's a lot of complexity here and there would be a lot of heavy negotiating among nations about who gets the contracts to do the work and supply the materials. Who develops the standards, etc., etc., etc. I don't mean to understate the logisticall morass that could ensue. But it's all workable.
Yes, this could all fail and we could wind up with nothing but military options remaining, having wasted time and resources. But frankly, time isn't on our side on this one. We need to act quickly and we can't depend on sufficient military resources in the near term, whatever the merits of that course might be. Even if a course such as I've suggest is tried and fails, we should be able to buy ourselves some time. Perhaps enough time to extricate ourselves from Iraq and again pose a legitimate threat of forceful leverage.
So, to my friend Dan and all those opposed to our presence in Iraq, I invite you to help me build this strategy to deal with Iran and North Korea effectively today. I find it troubling to hear so much hand wringing over Iraq when there is still so much to be done in other venues. I invite you to a dialogue designed to form and inform a positive strategy for incorporating the 2 apparently most lethal fringe nations into the modern international and global community. Or if you prefer another angle of addressing these states, articulate that instead. It is my belief that the nuclear ambitions of these nations must not merely be delayed, disrupted, or defused. They must be abolished. The future must be rewritten. Now Is The Time to turn our dialogue away from Iraq and its sniping for a moment and instead toward a positive vision for dealing with Iran & North Korea.
3 comments:
I wouldn't let anything anyone did or didn't do when they were sixteen years old give me any notion of where people stand on issues. But maybe that's just your way of providing a kind of nostalgic introduction to the topic.
Good post, albeit heavy on the sanctimony. Now is the time. Yesterday was the time. Tomorrow is the time. Whatever.
Good to take a cue from the Economist. I agree with most of what they have to say. If you aligned yourself a little closer with their view on Iraq, we'd be almost on the same page. But I think your party loyalty isn't ready for that logical conclusion.
I don't necessarily peg you a total neocon, but even you admit to share in most of what that camp proposes. So what sets you apart isn't clear, or important.
Despite the attitude of the let's-be-constructive-not-negative camp to which you belong, there is no conflict between opposing the Iraq war and not proposing a solution to the balance-of-power issues the world 'round. I oppose war generally on moral ground, and especially in a weak sauce case like Iraq was then and is now. I am not a pacifist. So "calling me out", so to speak, as though my opposition requires me to offer alternative solutions, presupposes that a) Iraq had a problem that needed solving, and b) that said problem was obvious, and c) that this problem involved the United States and its security. Since none of the above were established either before or after the war (after the mission was accomplished, rather) to my satisfaction, an "alternative" is not my burden to provide. Moreover, when our over-engagement in Iraq automatically negates what might be argued as our most effective tool (threat of force) to discouraging the two countries posing documented and admitted threats ... dismissing Iraq in favor of the status quo begs all kinds of questions I won't ask.
So, yes, on to N.K. and Iran, which arguably have little to nothing to do with Iraq or the war there. As you observed, I think your proposal is too expensive and complex. Getting down the practical, I don't see there being any real path to discouraging proliferation beyond strong diplomacy, economic incentives/sanctions, and alliance building. Leadership is what is needed. China needs convincing that it is in its best interests to use its newfound economic strength. Russia needs economic assistance sufficient to discourage the sale of reactors. Iran needs convincing that the U.S. will not help Israel pose a threat, meaning that the U.S. needs to rethink major portions of its Israel policy. Had the current administration not been mooning the world for the past two years, I might think that Bush and Powell could pull it off, given sufficiently large amounts of cash that have been spent elsewhere. Oh, yeah ... Powell is gone. Nevermind, it can't be done. ;-)
I'm not proposing the above because I'm a peacenik, although I arguably am that. I'm suggesting that there's no other feasible course that could actually be engaged in the present circumstances. Granted, this one has as slim a chance of success as any, what with the blatant distancing from the world by Bush & Co. over the past years, and "diplomats" like Bolton headed to represent our interests. But I don't see anything else happening.
(Moreover, Iraq has actually provided something of a test for your suggestion. Restrictions similar to those you propose were placed on Iraq. Inspections were performed, inspectors voiced opinions that WMDs were destroyed, but Iraq played its own image games and prevented transparency. Look where that got us, thousands of innocent lives and hundreds of billions later. If small infractions of restrictions are to result in all-out invasion, and if such shows of force are the only way to discourage violations, we will have given our enemies a fool-proof way to bankrupt the U.S., no 9/11 needed: You'll do more damage by feigning a threat that you aren't, causing the U.S. to alienate itself over your non-compliance, meanwhile distracting itself from other, growing threats.)
BTW, if there's one priceless lesson from Iraq, it should be that U.N. economic sanctions and inspections can and do discourage violations, even if inspections aren't perfect. That's not to say they will always work, but the U.S. was certain that they hadn't in Iraq, and they very much had, as documented by the Iraq WMD report. U.N. reforms with regard to corruption like OFF will only make such sanctions more effective, not less.
Ignore my Economist comment. I do like the publication, but realize that they're probably closer to your take than mine on Iraq. I think I was thinking of the American Conservative. :-)
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