The Pentagon's New Map - A Coherent & Thorough Vision of America's Global Security Role

Wednesday, June 22, 2005

A number of months ago, I came across the author of this book delivering a detailed and complex presentation on CSPAN. I only caught snippets, but was deeply impressed with the bits I saw. A few weeks later, I located and procured a copy of his book. I began reading The Pentagon's New Map with great interest, but as is often the case when I start new books, I got distracted before making much progress. However, in the past couple of weeks, I've returned to the book and have now completed it. I'm glad I did. I found it so compelling that I knew well before I actually completed it, that it would be the subject of my next post. In my opinion this is essential reading for anyone engaging in thoughtful discussion of Iraq, the war on Terrorism, the role of the US military in the world, etc.

PNM in: Hardcover
PNM in: Paperback

The author is Thomas P.M. Barnett. I'll defer to Mr. Barnett to give you his more complete particulars within the context of PNM. But his background is as a military analyst, with expertice in the former Soviet Union and China. PNM is significant in it's comprehensive contextual discussion of 9/11 and the war on terror. The essential context Barnett richly provides is his observation of end of the cold-war era, and Barnett is exceptionally qualified to provide it. While this material was engaging on its own merits, what I found truly epic about the work is its coherent expression of a robust strategic vision I believe the War on Terror and the War in Iraq has lacked.

To say that these initiatives have been defective for lack of vision is not to say the administration does not possess a meaningful vision. I am confident it does. The administration is not so irresponsible as to come this far down the tracks in Afghanistan and Iraq without such a vision. However, the administration has not effectively communicated a richer vision than a virtually perpetual jihad against global terrorism, we are left to wonder what it is. The least trusting among us are left to suppose the worst while the most trusting among us struggle to appreciate the anxiety of the less trusting. Whatever the administration's fuller vision, I am confident it would be enriched by integration with Mr. Barnett's.

Mr. Barnett's vision doesn't just satiate the hunger for a comprehensive vision. For me, it is also a morally rich vision. This is a vision which I believe not only could, but SHOULD serve as the basis for US foreign policy in the next several generations.

It's unfair to Mr. Barnett to attempt a summary of the work, but I'll do it anyway. The key concept, as the title describes, is a map of the globe. This map draws a dotted line between what Barnett describes as the core and the gap. The core are the globally integrated states. The gap are the non-integrated remainder of states. In general, the gap tends to occupy a geography visually resembling an inner-tube circling the globe's central latitudes. International connectedness is the discrimnating criteria for inclusion in the Core. Care nations also tend to economically better of, as a function of the very connectedness that defines them as members of the Core. Econ 101, or basic International Economics reveals this as a fairly obvious condition for economically open and integrated states.

Core states enjoy significantly higher levels of security, peace and stability. What provides this stability? Common rule sets and a version of mutually assured destruction that is economic in nature. Once nations and people have integrated and begun to enjoy the resultant rises in standards of living across their geographies, it's really hard to go back. Standard large-army war is so patently destructive to these economic advantages, that Core nations choose other means for resolving disputes. Not only is nuclear war out of the question for Core nations, but so is standard warfare with other Core states.

Alternatively, the Gap is characterized by isolation, disconnectedness and a "nothing-to-lose" mentality about warfare and conflict very disturbing to core nations. However, most of the gap nations are relatively economically destitute. So, for Gap nations, large-army war is also not an option. Instead, they must resort to more subversive methods. Their relative isolation also provides a safe haven for Usama types who want to operate off the Core's grid. In fact, these Usama types gain influence by re-inforceing isolationist sentiment and encouraging intolerance and hatred for the Core. In fact, they are dependent on disconnectedness and act to promote and defend that disconnectedness as long as they're around. Left unaltered, this virtually assures that the nation will continue in relative destitution.

Burnett observes that the dividends of our investment in the post-WWII and post-Cold War eras is a military without equal anywhere on the planet. He also recognizes that the core has begun to recognize a peace and security dividend which has propelled significant economic growth throught the core over approximately the last 20 years. Burnett then urges persuasively the existence of a moment of unprecedented opportunity to further extend the benefits of life in the Core to nations and peoples long victimized by repetitive regimes of repression. It is this concept of opportunity that is the essence of Barnett's vision. And it is this essence that epitomizes the resulting morality of his vision. In my opinion, there is not only an unprecedented opportunity to further US national security interests by expanding the Core and shrinking the Gap, but there is a concomitant moral obligation associated with this position of unrivaled military might we've worked so persistently to obtain.

In the context of this purposeful vision, Barnett addresses a variety of directly related topics. These include recommendations to overhaul the military to meet the evolving demands to be placed on those valuable resources, the doctrine of pre-emption, regime change, empire building, etc. None of these discussion topics come as any surprise, but the results Barnett reaches seem crisper and more certain because of the context PNM provides. Thankfully, Barnett does not limit himself to discussion of these obviously related subjects. He also takes time and pains to address key supporting subjects, such as economic policy, energy policy, immigration policy, foreign aid, etc. Again, the context PNM provides, draws proper US policy on these subjects into sharp focus and lends signficant credibility to Barnett's conclusions.

Only after finishing the book did I locate Barnett's personal site and begin tracking his blog. I haven't had the time to come up to speed entirely, but I quickly learned of Barnett's sequel work, already submitted to the publisher, Blueprint For Action, which Amazon reports will be shipping 10/20/2005. PNM was published in April, 2004, so it's certainly not out of date. Besides, a vision this epic becomes a landmark by which we mark time, rather than time taking a toll on it. However, the rapidly evolving circumstances around the War in Iraq and the greater War on Terror led me to wonder about a sequel work before I ever finished reading PNM. So, as soon as I finished, I begain the search for more Barnett materials and more current Barnett materials. I'm anxious to get my hands on a copy of Barnett's blueprint. Until then, the articles and blogs will keep me on pace with Barnett. And in the meantime, perhaps the administration can find its way toward Barnett's vision and begin pursuing a vision that is both more purposeful and more vivid or explicit.