Supreme Court Furor

Monday, June 27, 2005

With the whispers of Rhenquist or possibly O'Connor departing the Court in short order, the moment we've all been waiting for is drawing nearer. Has it really been about 150 years since we went this long without a change to the court? It's a moment for which millions of dollars have been raised and will be spent. But as we wait for the dust storm to settle, the Court has offered a subject for us to sink our teeth into as an appetizer. Eminent domain.

Yeah, I know, not the most engaging of topics. It's not war. It's not abortion. But the court missed an important one here in my opinion and paves the way for a really bad model of Eminent Domain. The case is Kelo v. City of New London.

The facts go something like this. State and local officials targetted a 90 acre plat of property in New London, Connecticut, known as Fort Trumball for economic revitalization. The area included about 115 residences. The city adopted a development plan calling for the creation of 7 parcels. Parcel 1 was designated for a hotel. Parcel 2 for about 70 new upscale homes. Parcel 3 called for 90,000 sqf of R&D space in an area adjacent to a proposed Pfizer development. Parcel 4 was dedicated to support of an adjacent state park and a marina. Parcels 5-7 were allocated for a variety of retail spaces, parking and other commercial uses. The plan was to be executed by a private development firm, the New London Development Corporation.

The pertinent portion of the Fifth Ammendment says "nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation."

The court granted certiorari for the specific purpose of determining "whether a city's decision to take property for the purpose of economic development satisfies the 'public use' requirement of the Fifth Ammendment."

In legal terms, such an exercise of eminent domain is referred to as a taking. The purpose of the 5th Ammendment was to proscribe the use of this power, so that the government could not take property from party A, except where the taking would generate a justification of use by the general public. The 5th Ammendement clearly permits the government to take under the specified conditions. Case law on the subject has permitted taking from private party A in favor of private party B, so long as the 'public use' requirement is met. There are elements of the development plan which might rise to the level of public use, specifically the planned uses for parcel 4. Parcel 4 was actually described by the court in 2 parts. 4A pertains to a 2.4 acre plot dedicated to support of the adjacent state park. 4B pertains to the marina. These 2 small pieces out of a 90 acre piece of property in which 115 residences house property owners and their families.

The case was decided on a vote of 5-4. The majority opinion (penned by Stevens and joined by Kennedy, Souter, Ginsberg & Breyer) cited a series of cases in which the Court had previously enlarged the concept of 'general public use' to a broader definition of 'public benefit'. It then, somewhat oddly, urged an essentially "states rights" defense of this decision that the state and local government know best the needs of their constituents and can well determine which property uses will generate public benefits. But this is a strange sort of de facto justification. The public benefits if the economic development plan works? So, does that mean that any successful economic development plan justifies the taking that fueled it? Does it also mean that every failed economic development plan was unjustified? The court actually seems to permit either, so long as the government's heart is in the right place.

George Will wrote persuasively on the Court's decison last Friday. He recognized an important and subtle reality. While a taking by the government from private party A in favor of private party B does not appear to directly benefit the government, it is also not a disinterested party in these cases. Hence, trusting the government to deal fairly in such matters would be naive to the extreme. He observed that "during oral arguments in February, Justice Antonin Scalia distilled the essence of New London's brazen claim: 'You can take from A and give to B if B pays more taxes?' " The court's decision combined with the government's own tax-maximizing self-interest constitutes both the spark and fuel necessary to start a wildfire, whether actually intentioned or mere coincidence.

Justice O'Connor wrote the dissent in which Rhenquist, Scalia & Thomas joined. She drew her dissent to a conclusion writing:

"Any property may now be taken for the benefit of another private party, but the fallout from this decision will not be random. The beneficiaries are likely to be those citizens with disproportionate influence and power in the political process, including large corporations and development firms. As for victims, the government now has license to transfer property from those with fewer resources to those with more. The Founders cannot have intended this perverse result. 'That alone is a just government,' wrote James Madison, 'which impartially secures to every man , whatever is his own.'"

The impact of this decision causes the names affixed to the votes seem counter-intuitive. I'd expect the Justices in this majority to be champions of the individual, especially the underprivileged. I guess it's another question of trust. The majority trusts the government to apply its takings with less interference than I do. And the worst part of this decision is that replacing O'Connor or Rhenquist on the court, as all the discussion has recently turned, will have no impact whatever on this decision in the future.

The Pentagon's New Map - A Coherent & Thorough Vision of America's Global Security Role

Wednesday, June 22, 2005

A number of months ago, I came across the author of this book delivering a detailed and complex presentation on CSPAN. I only caught snippets, but was deeply impressed with the bits I saw. A few weeks later, I located and procured a copy of his book. I began reading The Pentagon's New Map with great interest, but as is often the case when I start new books, I got distracted before making much progress. However, in the past couple of weeks, I've returned to the book and have now completed it. I'm glad I did. I found it so compelling that I knew well before I actually completed it, that it would be the subject of my next post. In my opinion this is essential reading for anyone engaging in thoughtful discussion of Iraq, the war on Terrorism, the role of the US military in the world, etc.

PNM in: Hardcover
PNM in: Paperback

The author is Thomas P.M. Barnett. I'll defer to Mr. Barnett to give you his more complete particulars within the context of PNM. But his background is as a military analyst, with expertice in the former Soviet Union and China. PNM is significant in it's comprehensive contextual discussion of 9/11 and the war on terror. The essential context Barnett richly provides is his observation of end of the cold-war era, and Barnett is exceptionally qualified to provide it. While this material was engaging on its own merits, what I found truly epic about the work is its coherent expression of a robust strategic vision I believe the War on Terror and the War in Iraq has lacked.

To say that these initiatives have been defective for lack of vision is not to say the administration does not possess a meaningful vision. I am confident it does. The administration is not so irresponsible as to come this far down the tracks in Afghanistan and Iraq without such a vision. However, the administration has not effectively communicated a richer vision than a virtually perpetual jihad against global terrorism, we are left to wonder what it is. The least trusting among us are left to suppose the worst while the most trusting among us struggle to appreciate the anxiety of the less trusting. Whatever the administration's fuller vision, I am confident it would be enriched by integration with Mr. Barnett's.

Mr. Barnett's vision doesn't just satiate the hunger for a comprehensive vision. For me, it is also a morally rich vision. This is a vision which I believe not only could, but SHOULD serve as the basis for US foreign policy in the next several generations.

It's unfair to Mr. Barnett to attempt a summary of the work, but I'll do it anyway. The key concept, as the title describes, is a map of the globe. This map draws a dotted line between what Barnett describes as the core and the gap. The core are the globally integrated states. The gap are the non-integrated remainder of states. In general, the gap tends to occupy a geography visually resembling an inner-tube circling the globe's central latitudes. International connectedness is the discrimnating criteria for inclusion in the Core. Care nations also tend to economically better of, as a function of the very connectedness that defines them as members of the Core. Econ 101, or basic International Economics reveals this as a fairly obvious condition for economically open and integrated states.

Core states enjoy significantly higher levels of security, peace and stability. What provides this stability? Common rule sets and a version of mutually assured destruction that is economic in nature. Once nations and people have integrated and begun to enjoy the resultant rises in standards of living across their geographies, it's really hard to go back. Standard large-army war is so patently destructive to these economic advantages, that Core nations choose other means for resolving disputes. Not only is nuclear war out of the question for Core nations, but so is standard warfare with other Core states.

Alternatively, the Gap is characterized by isolation, disconnectedness and a "nothing-to-lose" mentality about warfare and conflict very disturbing to core nations. However, most of the gap nations are relatively economically destitute. So, for Gap nations, large-army war is also not an option. Instead, they must resort to more subversive methods. Their relative isolation also provides a safe haven for Usama types who want to operate off the Core's grid. In fact, these Usama types gain influence by re-inforceing isolationist sentiment and encouraging intolerance and hatred for the Core. In fact, they are dependent on disconnectedness and act to promote and defend that disconnectedness as long as they're around. Left unaltered, this virtually assures that the nation will continue in relative destitution.

Burnett observes that the dividends of our investment in the post-WWII and post-Cold War eras is a military without equal anywhere on the planet. He also recognizes that the core has begun to recognize a peace and security dividend which has propelled significant economic growth throught the core over approximately the last 20 years. Burnett then urges persuasively the existence of a moment of unprecedented opportunity to further extend the benefits of life in the Core to nations and peoples long victimized by repetitive regimes of repression. It is this concept of opportunity that is the essence of Barnett's vision. And it is this essence that epitomizes the resulting morality of his vision. In my opinion, there is not only an unprecedented opportunity to further US national security interests by expanding the Core and shrinking the Gap, but there is a concomitant moral obligation associated with this position of unrivaled military might we've worked so persistently to obtain.

In the context of this purposeful vision, Barnett addresses a variety of directly related topics. These include recommendations to overhaul the military to meet the evolving demands to be placed on those valuable resources, the doctrine of pre-emption, regime change, empire building, etc. None of these discussion topics come as any surprise, but the results Barnett reaches seem crisper and more certain because of the context PNM provides. Thankfully, Barnett does not limit himself to discussion of these obviously related subjects. He also takes time and pains to address key supporting subjects, such as economic policy, energy policy, immigration policy, foreign aid, etc. Again, the context PNM provides, draws proper US policy on these subjects into sharp focus and lends signficant credibility to Barnett's conclusions.

Only after finishing the book did I locate Barnett's personal site and begin tracking his blog. I haven't had the time to come up to speed entirely, but I quickly learned of Barnett's sequel work, already submitted to the publisher, Blueprint For Action, which Amazon reports will be shipping 10/20/2005. PNM was published in April, 2004, so it's certainly not out of date. Besides, a vision this epic becomes a landmark by which we mark time, rather than time taking a toll on it. However, the rapidly evolving circumstances around the War in Iraq and the greater War on Terror led me to wonder about a sequel work before I ever finished reading PNM. So, as soon as I finished, I begain the search for more Barnett materials and more current Barnett materials. I'm anxious to get my hands on a copy of Barnett's blueprint. Until then, the articles and blogs will keep me on pace with Barnett. And in the meantime, perhaps the administration can find its way toward Barnett's vision and begin pursuing a vision that is both more purposeful and more vivid or explicit.

Now Is The Time - Looking Ahead to North Korea & Iran

Thursday, May 19, 2005

My long-time friend has hosted a blog for years at the Improvist. We've managed to orchestrate the semblance of a respectful relationship for years now despite some time, distance and significant political disparateness. A lot of that disparateness is probably rhetorical. I try to remind him that we aren't as different as we sometimes sound, but this belies an undeniable core of genuine difference.

I think I knew this would always be the case when one morning on our walk to High School, we were discussing the upcoming Presidential election. I had just reached the age of majority and was preparing to cast my first ever Presidential ballot for then VP, George H. Bush. It was an easy decision for me. My mind had been made up for a long time and Dukakis did little to alter my nascent pseudo-independent thinking. My dad was active in the local Republican party, and I had participated in a variety of political events, campaigns and activities with my dad and with the party over the preceding years. Mostly by association with my Dad. But, not surprisingly, my political temperment was cast early in the mold of my parents, particularly my Dad, who I respected for his cool analytical reasoning.

Though my friend Dan now claims not to remember saying it, I do. He casually mentioned in that conversation on the way to school that (he was not yet old enough to vote) he considered Jesse Jackson a good candidate. Maybe he was making it up. Maybe, since he wasn't voting, he wasn't really following the race. Whatever the case, I think I first knew at that moment that my friend and I were different. For all we had in comon in terms of background, upbringing, religion, etc., we really had some fundamentally divergent ways of looking at public policy. Coming to a better understanding of those differences and the forces that motivate them has been and continues to be an irreplaceable education for me. Thanks Dan.

Since that day, we've agreed on a lot of important things, shared a lot of interests and have continued to disagree on a lot of political stuff. The War in Iraq is no exception. I won't attempt to detail the subtleties of those differences here. In fact, I won't at present take time to detail my own admittedly complex opinion of the war. Now is the time for a more important discourse.

A May 12th article in the Economist made the urgency of this discourse clear to me. Whatever your opinion of the War in Iraq, one thing is certain, the planet presently has 2 important nuclear rogues to deal with in Iran and North Korea, whatever stage of rogueness may actually attend them. The time is ripe for an active and vigorous discussion of US and international policy with regard to these two states. Dan will assert that I have adopted a neocon agenda which will shortly call for US military pressure on one of both of these "next threats". I respectfully dissent. I hope the reaso for that dissent will be clear in what follows.

The present trajectory of both of these states with regard to nuclear might is unambiguous. All reasonable paths to prevent these dual collision courses from materializing must be aggressively debated. A unifying policy must be developed to deal with these and future putative nuclear nations. Let us leave Iraq behind for a moment.

To my good friend and all who have bravely and boldly opposed the military invasion of Iraq, I say, now is your golden hour. Show us the better way. There are 2 fertile fields in which your notions for effectively managing a rogue nuclear proliferator may be suitably tested. I would urge that the military and economic commitment the US has made to Iraq makes similar activity in Iran and North Korea virtually impossible, even if it were warranted. Cold War tactics and strategies won't do, they simply aren't in the offing this time around. What is the goal? Containment doesn't suffice. Something bold and something proactive must be done to turn the tide of nuclear development among these states. The risks of failure are grave. These fringe states simply can't be permitted to traffic in these materials because they do not subscribe to the same rules of engagement in handling them that must accompany them. So, how to proceed?

I offer for your consideration this possible strategy. So much of the high stakes game that is nuclear proliferation hide and seek is justified by the excuses of need for nuclear power. I say take all those excuses away. Give these nations all the nuclear power they want. I don't mean permit them to develop it. I mean, as a government, give it to them! Give them lots of it. More than they need. Teach them to safely use and control it. It doesn't matter that Iran has sufficient oil & gas and does not need nuclear power. Eliminate the excuse. If it works, it will be cheaper by far than the costs of military involvement. Also invite them to the table of the international community, with economic openness, development and all that comes with it, as much as they can stomache and then a little more.

All that is given to these nations should be given by the international community as a whole. Not by a single nation. Individual nations contribute, and the international community distributes the technology openly and transparently. What are the strings? Simple:

Offer all this with just two conditions: 1) they agree now and forever to destroy and end all development of nuclear weapons programs, and 2) they agree to vigorous, open, ongoing inspections of all nuclear programs and sites. Consequences for breaking this agreement must be severe, but the incentives for them to remain true to the conditions must be likewise substantial. Carrot and stick diplomacy of the simplest kind, no doubt. Perhaps we add some final conditions regarding economic openness. The more effectively we integrate these nations into the global economy and society, the more they'll gain, the more they'll have to lose and the less of a threat they'll become.

There are at least a couple of obvious concerns with such a policy. One is simply the cost to administer such a program in these two nations. Aggravating these cost concerns is the potential for nations who do not currently exhibit nuclear ambitions to develop them for the explicit purpose of obtaining a similar "aid" package. Actually, I don't think this is a criticism at all. I'm not setting them up as straw men, they just seemed to me to be the biggest immediate questions about a program of this sort. The costs are dramatically lower than military options. And I say the more nations who want to participate, the merrier. Perhaps over time, this model could prove to be a meaningful way to bring many such fringe nations into the international community. The same conditions would apply to every nation taking advantage of the program. They'd have to agree to our rules about usage and nonproliferation. Again, I urge consideration of the costs of Iraq. Not just the direct costs, but also the indirect charges against the US credibility and respect around the world.

The other major concern I see is that these nations simply abuse the gesture and use the programs as a step stool to develop weapons programs anyway. So, we destroy the gift. We're out the money and now the international community is more unified in deeling with the offenders. There's also the risk that inspections don't reveal underground weapons development programs and the international community gets a surprise. It's a risk. But if we design the technology and we monitor its use vigorously, we're good for the short term. In the long term, it's the economic openness that pays the dividends. Before long, their integration in the developing world economy will present a value in terms of connectedness that outweighs the value of developing or using nuclear weapons.

In my mind the largest disadvantage of our present commitment in Iraq is the manner in which our usual threats to rogue states are rendered impotent. Any fringe nation with an ounce of intelligence knows we're spread thin. Today, the threats don't carry the (arguably little) weight they'd carry were we not otherwise engaged. The critical consequence is that any policy of intimidation or strong-arm diplomacy faces significany obstacles from a credibility perspective. We may or may not have the will to carry out more threats, but we don't have the resources to do much more than we're doing today, and consequently can do little more than wave a threatening finger.

In my opinion the best way to generate long-term stability with these fringe potential nuclear states is to open them up economically and socially. We need to be prepared to provide sufficient incentive for them to do so. Obviously, we can't be foolish enough to give greatly without demanding things in return. But making everything conditional doesn't always work either. Sometimes, you have to prime the pump. We need to be prepared to make the first overtures. When I say we, I don't just mean the US unilaterally. We in these instances means the international community as a whole and even Europe in particular. We need to help motivate it, but it might almost work better if we keep a low profile, particularly in the case of Iran. Conversely in North Korea, it might actually work better if the US is more directly involved. That's what they want. Give them some legitimacy. Give them some respect. But clearly define the rules of the next stage of their national development.

Operationally, there's a lot of complexity here and there would be a lot of heavy negotiating among nations about who gets the contracts to do the work and supply the materials. Who develops the standards, etc., etc., etc. I don't mean to understate the logisticall morass that could ensue. But it's all workable.

Yes, this could all fail and we could wind up with nothing but military options remaining, having wasted time and resources. But frankly, time isn't on our side on this one. We need to act quickly and we can't depend on sufficient military resources in the near term, whatever the merits of that course might be. Even if a course such as I've suggest is tried and fails, we should be able to buy ourselves some time. Perhaps enough time to extricate ourselves from Iraq and again pose a legitimate threat of forceful leverage.

So, to my friend Dan and all those opposed to our presence in Iraq, I invite you to help me build this strategy to deal with Iran and North Korea effectively today. I find it troubling to hear so much hand wringing over Iraq when there is still so much to be done in other venues. I invite you to a dialogue designed to form and inform a positive strategy for incorporating the 2 apparently most lethal fringe nations into the modern international and global community. Or if you prefer another angle of addressing these states, articulate that instead. It is my belief that the nuclear ambitions of these nations must not merely be delayed, disrupted, or defused. They must be abolished. The future must be rewritten. Now Is The Time to turn our dialogue away from Iraq and its sniping for a moment and instead toward a positive vision for dealing with Iran & North Korea.

Inaugural - A Cheating Culture

Wednesday, May 04, 2005

blogger.com made launching this first blog really simple. By far, the hardest part was naming the blog. I think I've found the perfect match.

I've followed the steroid scandall in baseball for so long now I'm entirely fed up with it. I don't care how Bud Selig & Donald Fehr ultimately attempt their restoration of public confidence. It's not likely to do much for me. I'm a huge baseball fan. I love the game. It's a great combination of individual effort with team concepts. It's a game of numbers and strategy, pure power and graceful ellegance. I love it.

But I'm absolutely fed up with all the discussion about "performance enhancing substances." I'm tired of talking about the substances. The steroids, the creams, the injections, the andro, the greenies. It's pathetic. I'd like to see us start talking about the men, the boys, the cheaters, the un-cheaters. It's time to talk about character. It's time to raise our expectations.

Policing professional sports at the level and cost required to keep cheaters from cheating and keep the sport "clean" is ridiculous. I'd argue it's a waste of money. If we have to spend that much money to keep play clean, let's just stop playing. That could never happen unless the fans decide they've had enough and send the signals. There's a ton of money involved and it creates incentives to cheat. But we should be able to expect our sports icons to resist those temptations. Isn't that what we're all teaching our kids?

VanGundy, Stern, Cuban et al. exhibit some of the most disgusting fruits of a cheating culture. An accusation of cheating arises and we spend a week talking about the accusation and wondering if the accuser is actually the one trying to cheat. I'm almost willing to stop following organized sports altogether. I enjoy them so much that would be difficult, but I'm so fed up with all of it. The worst part is, fleeing the cheating mentality of so many premier athletes and executives leaves one no alternate haven. Sadly, there's no refuge from which this culture of cheating can be entirely avoided.

President Bush has introduced accountability processes into our public educational system. I applaud that. By so doing, he has also hightened the pressures on many school administrators and educators throughout the country. I also applaud that. Inasmuch as these noble, self-sacrificing souls have volunteered to care for our children and ensure their successful education, we can trust them to do so with the greatest possible integrity, right? Wrong. We now learn that the very educators entrusted in inculcate the tools and standards of successful living and teaching cheating. Houston Independent School District.

Where does it end? We're learning daily about where it's starting, in elementary schools and primary schools throughout the country at the hand of those we expect to do precisely the reverse.

Who's to blame? The athletes? The educators? Of course not, they're just victims of a culture of cheating like you and me. Humbug. I don't believe it. Cheating and accountability are opposite ends of the same stick. To deal vigorously with a culture of cheating means to elevate standards of personal accountability. The pendulum has swung too far in the wrong direction. Turning the tide requires penalties that are clear, swift and forceful.

But that's just how to deal with adult cheaters in the act. Regretably, popular culture is full of cheating models. I'm even fond of a few of them myself. Can't wait for The Itallian Job II in 2006 (or whatever the official title will be), even though it's a show about cheaters just like Oceans 11/12 which I happened to enjoy a great deal. Culturally, we need to choose heros worthy of the title. Role models fitting the obligations of celbrity. Whatever your other moral persuasion on moral subjects of every sort, surely cheating can universally be agreed upon as a target to be driven out of our lexicon.

It's just so tiring not to be able to believe anyone any more.